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Abstract 
We use firm-level data for France and Italy to explore the impact of service regulation 
reform implemented in the two countries on the mark-up and eventually on the performance of 
firms between the second half of the 1990s and 2007. We find that the relation between entry 
barriers and productivity is negative and is crucially intermediated through the firm’s mark up. If 
both countries adopted OECD’s best practices in terms of entry barriers, their TFP level would 
increase by 3% for Italy and 3.5% for France.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The OECD policy makers who slashed regulatory barriers in many countries over the thirty 
years preceding the current crisis acted under the assumption that lower regulation allows firms 
to achieve a better economic performance. The policy stance in favour of deregulation has 
generally been supported by a large body of literature pointing to negative effects of entry 
barriers, red-tape or legal requirements on economic performance and notably firm productivity. 
Yet, while considerable effort has been devoted to the search for significant correlation, less 
attention has gone to spell out the details of the transmission mechanism through which this 
relation between regulation and firm productivity is expected to materialize. Our paper lies in 
this area of empirical research. However, rather than concentrating the attention on a broad 
cross-section of countries and on deregulation as such, we study the details of this process 
looking at one specific - but in our view crucial - aspect of deregulation, namely the reduction of 
entry barriers in the service industries in two regulation-riddled countries, France and Italy. As of 
1998, both countries posted the highest values (behind Greece) for the Product Market 
Regulation (PMR) index constructed by the OECD. Since then, extensive deregulation of 
professional business activities, network industries and retail have been implemented in both 
countries, although in a scattered fashion across industries and across countries. This process 
has occurred with special emphasis on the entry barriers’ side to which we devote our attention. 
In our paper, we exploit this country-industry variation building time varying qualitative variables 
that summarize the implementation of reduction in entry barriers for retail, road freight, airlines, 
post, telecommunications and business services. We contrast this variation with firm-level 
variation over 1998-2007 in the behavior of total factor productivity, the most commonly 
accepted - though by no means perfect - measure of efficiency. If deregulation is aimed to be 
efficiency enhancing, it should positively affect total factor productivity. And indeed this is what 
Nickell (1996), Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) and Griffith, Harrison and Simpson 
(2010) have found: a negative relation between regulation and productivity. This also stems 
from the results of Schivardi and Viviano (2011) where barriers to entry in the Italian retail sector 
had been found to be positively related to profit margins and negatively to productivity.  
2 BACKGROUND DISCUSSION ON REGULATION AND EFFICIENCY 
In this section we provide some background discussion and show how our results 
complement those from previous studies within the already broad research agenda on 
regulation and productivity. 
As discussed in Schiantarelli (2008), the negative relation between competition and 
efficiency stems from first principles. When regulatory reforms lead to more competitive output 
markets, the wedge between prices and marginal costs is reduced and the allocation of goods 
and resources, in the absence of other distortions, becomes more efficient in a static sense, due 
to the pressure triggered by fiercer competition onto individual firms. Additional efficiency gains 
may originate through economies of scale and scope. 
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Over time, a more competitive climate will also drive the less efficient firms to exit and, 
through this channel, market shares will shift from lower to higher productivity firms, leading to a 
more efficient factor allocation in the industry. Yet, as discussed by Nickell, Nicolitsas, and 
Dryden (1997), the details of the transmission mechanism through which competition raises 
efficiency are not always clear-cut. The literature on corporate governance and firm 
performance
1
 has shown that in a more competitive environment owners may more easily 
monitor and compare managers’ performance and enhance their incentives. Incentive 
realignment is not the only potential mechanism of transmission between competition and 
efficiency, though. Managers may also be induced to work harder as increased competition 
triggers the threat of bankruptcy. In a nutshell, the more competition the less managerial slack. 
At the same time, however, a higher bankruptcy threat reduces equilibrium profits, which may 
reduce the scope for granting monetary incentives to managers, which - as shown by Schmidt 
(1997) - makes the relation between competition and efficiency through bankruptcy threats 
ambiguous. Altogether, on the theory side, there are sufficient ambiguities or caveats, 
concerning the direction of the effect of regulatory reform on firm efficiency, that empirical 
research in this area is essential to reach definite conclusions about the impact of product 
market regulation. On the empirical side, there is an established tradition of firm and industry 
studies investigating the direct effects of regulation on the performance of firms in the regulated 
sector. Sector-specific restrictions, such as those prevailing in utilities and services, have been 
shown to decrease productivity growth (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003), investment (Alesina, 
Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli, 2005) and employment (Bertrand and Kramartz, 2002), as 
well as to increase prices (Martin, Roma and Vansteenkiste, 2005) in the regulated sectors with 
both firm-level and industry data.
2
 Of particular relevance for the issues we are discussing here 
is the paper by Nickell (1996), where firm-level data for the UK have been employed to 
investigate whether changes in competition affect productivity levels and growth rates. In 
Nickell’s study, competition was measured in several ways, including industry level measures of 
monopoly rents, concentration, import penetration, and number of competitors. By estimating a 
dynamic production function with the competition variables as additional regressors, and 
allowing for endogeneity of input choices, Nickell found that greater competition has a positive 
effect both on the level and the growth of productivity.
3
 The results in Nickell have been 
confirmed by Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2000), with a bigger UK data set. Apart from the 
direct effects on the firms within the same industry where the regulatory measure is enacted, 
regulation may also have relevant indirect effects on resource allocation in downstream 
industries. Barone and Cingano (2011) and Bourles, Cette, Lopez, Mairesse and Nicoletti 
                                                     
1 Holmström (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) showed that perfect competition reveals full information about the 
occurrence of common cost shocks to shareholders and therefore enables shareholders’ monitoring. The result that 
competition reduces the amount of managerial slack is also confirmed by Hart (1983), with the caveat set forth by 
Scharfstein (1988): if risk-averse managers are allowed to respond to monetary incentives, the effort enhancing effect of 
competition becomes ambiguous. Hermalin (1992) studies the influence of product market competition on managerial 
performance and shows that under certain conditions increased competition reduces agency costs. 
2 Barriers to entry have also been shown to reduce the growth in the number of firms (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 
2006) and increase industry concentration (Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004) in developed countries and - in a 
particularly distorting extent - output, employment and investment in developing countries (Besley and Burgess, 2002, 
and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). 
3 In Nickell’s paper, firm-level variables are instrumented within a dynamic panel GMM approach while competition 
variables are not. However, if fast-growing firms gain market shares, the market becomes more concentrated and less 
competitive. Hence this may cause a downward bias to the estimates of the effect of competition on productivity. In this 
case, the estimated effect represents a lower bound on the true effect of competition on productivity. 
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(2010) - with some methodological differences - have employed input-output matrices to 
construct indicators of dependence of downstream activities (typically manufacturing) on 
upstream industries (typically services). They were thus able to study how regulation in the 
supply of a variety of services (energy and utilities, professional services) affects the economic 
performance of downstream manufacturing industries. Their results indicate that the indirect 
costs of regulation are the bulk of the costs of regulation. Our analysis is narrower in scope and 
therefore we cannot calculate these second-round effects. Yet, by specifically addressing one 
aspect of regulation such as entry barriers, our study can keep track of the transmission 
mechanism through which regulation may affect performance. This is instead hidden in a black 
box in such broader and more ambitious studies. 
The elusiveness of the empirical relation between competition and efficiency has also to do 
with measurement and specification issues. Investigating the impact of deregulation on 
economic performance may be problematic for, as discussed by Winston (1993), regulation is 
inherently multidimensional. It involves pricing, entry and exit decisions within an industry as 
well as health and safety of workplaces and products, and the accuracy of the information being 
disseminated about such products. Different bits of deregulation may be successful in one 
respect and less in others. It has also been shown that the different bits may be collinear with 
each other, thereby making the task of identifying the effect of each bit, separately, a daunting 
one. Griffith and Harrison (2004, Appendix D, Table 30-33) have shown that the estimates of 
coefficients of electricity, gas and water supply are heavily specification-dependent in industry’s 
employment and productivity regressions. Finally, while the expected correlation between the 
extent of regulation and the mark up is relatively clear-cut and positive in most cases, the 
expected sign of the relation between mark-up and economic performance is more ambiguous. 
Lower mark-ups may indeed be associated to better economic performance but only if the static 
efficiency gains brought about by deregulation more than offset the scope for funding the fixed 
costs of research and innovation, enabled by the extra profits originating in a close-to-monopoly 
setting. Within the so called Neo-Schumpeterian tradition (Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Aghion, 
Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005)), the relation between competition and productivity is 
assumed and empirically shown to take an inverted U form because of the interplay between 
the so called “escape competition” and “Schumpeterian” effects. 
When regulation is high, more competition through lower mark-ups fosters innovation, as 
firms are encouraged to innovate in order to escape competition. As competition becomes 
fiercer and average profits decrease, the benefits from catching-up with the average firm 
diminish for laggards, which are then discouraged from the fact that convergence has largely 
taken place. Hence, from a certain degree of competition, the latter effect dominates the former 
and the relation between competition and efficiency becomes negative. This effect is more likely 
to be observed for innovation-related variables but it may be there for productivity as well. 
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3 DATA AND INDICATORS 
 Data 3.1
To study the relation between regulation in services and productivity we use firm level data 
on France and Italy in 1998-2007 to compute a productivity indicator (TFP) and other control 
variables from two different data sets, and we use the OECD product market regulation 
database to derive barrier-to-entry indicators. Our empirical analysis merges two firm-level 
annual datasets, FiBEn for French firms, constructed by Banque de France, and AIDA for Italian 
firms, a Bureau van Dijk database. Both databases contain individual accounts (as opposed to 
consolidated accounts for groups), based on the balance sheets provided by firms to the tax 
administration. FiBEn includes most French firms with sales exceeding €750,000 per year or 
with credit outstanding of at least €380,000 and some firms below; hence its coverage is 
excellent for large firms but rather limited for small firms. AIDA has a better coverage of small 
firms, with no minimum limit for sales, but only limited companies and limited liability companies 
are included.
4
 Our period of analysis is long enough to include a few regulatory policy changes 
taking place in both countries. Its length is dictated by data availability in the AIDA database. 
The firms whose behavior we aim to investigate belong to nine service sectors that include retail, 
freight road and passenger air transportation, post, telecommunications and professional 
services (see the detailed list in Table 1). In all these sectors there are barriers to entry due to 
regulatory constraints. In the other sectors of the economy, regulatory barriers to entry are 
estimated to be non-existent by the OECD over the estimation period. This by no means implies 
overall absence of barriers to entry: these sectors, particularly the manufacturing ones, may in 
fact face other kind of barriers to entry due to strategic behavior of competitors or a very high 
minimum scale of production to reach a break-even point (natural monopoly case). Yet these 
barriers are largely not policy-induced and are therefore outside the domain of this work. 
The main descriptive statistics for the database are presented in Table 1, in turn sub-divided 
in two panels describing summary data for firms and variables. From the upper panel (also 
labeled Table 1.1), one learns that Italy’s AIDA is a larger database, with 15 070 service firms 
over the 1998-2007 period, against 13 349 firms for FiBEn over the same period of time. This 
table shows that the two datasets are rather similar in their industry composition. More than 90 
per cent of the firms in both datasets are from just three sectors: retail (some two thirds of the 
total firms in each sample), road freight transports (some 20 per cent of the total in both 
datasets) and accounting services (about 5 per cent of the total). As to the other business 
services, a bigger share of engineering and consultancy services firms in France is by and large 
offset by a bigger share of architectural services in Italy. In order to control for these differences 
in sample, we use firm fixed effect and country- year dummies throughout the estimates. 
Table 1.1 also shows that the two datasets closely conform to expectations in terms of firm 
size distribution. Eighty per cent of the firms in the AIDA sample are small firms, i.e. employing 
less than twenty employees. In France this share is slightly above one half of the total, instead. 
This is partly the result of a database bias (the French database under-estimates the share of 
                                                     
4 In 2008, there were 1215585 firms registered in AIDA, whose legal form was SPA, SRL, and cooperatives (other 
forms are present but residuals). No individual firms are present. The former two legal forms allow a responsibility 
regardless companies debts, limited to their equity. Unlike SRL (“Società a Responsabilità Limitata”), SPA (“Società Per 
Azioni”) is a public company.  
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small firms in the total population) but it also reflects the actual underlying firm size distribution 
in the two countries.  
 Productivity and regulation indicators 3.2
Productivity 
AIDA and FiBEn allows one to calculate firm-level value added (Q), capital (K) and 
employment (L). 
These are the ingredients to calculate productivity indicators – our output variables of 
interest. 
Value added (Q) is computed as follows: Q is equal to the sales of merchandises minus the 
cost of merchandises minus the change in merchandise inventory plus the amount of production 
sold (goods and services) plus the amount of production stocked plus the amount of production 
incorporated in the capital stock minus the cost of raw materials minus the change in raw 
material inventories minus the other costs and external charges (including wages of external 
workers) plus net-of-tax production subsidies.
5
 The volume of value added is then calculated by 
dividing it by a national accounting index of value added price at the two-digit industry level. As 
we do not have prices at the firm level, we may wrongly measure - and thus misinterpret - an 
increase in the firm’s relative price of output with an increase in firm’s productivity; our control 
for changes in turnover should however limit this bias. The initial total capital stock is estimated 
as the gross value of all non-financial assets, deflated by an appropriate deflator from the 
national accounts. Since the gross value of capital is at its historical cost, it is adjusted to correct 
for the age of the stock. Gross capital at historical price is divided by a national index for 
investment price, lagged by the average age of gross capital (itself calculated from the share of 
depreciated capital in gross capital at historical prices). The average employment level (L) is 
directly available in FiBEn and AIDA, while data for hours worked or temporary workers 
employed by Temporary Work Agencies are not provided. Our data include workers on fixed-
term contracts as long as they are hired by the firm and not by a Work Agency. For France, data 
on costs of using temporary work agencies are available. A correction of employment on the 
basis of an average wage showed a very limited impact of temporary workers on TFP. With 
these data we derived a measure of total factor productivity (TFP). When evaluating the 
consequences of deregulation, employing a productivity concept that is invariant to the intensity 
of use of observable factor inputs is advisable. Ours is calculated according to a growth 
accounting methodology within a Cobb-Douglas framework, with factor shares equal to the 
share in revenue, perfect competition in factor and product markets and constant returns to 
scale. We do test these assumptions in the robustness check part, where labor and capital are 
allowed to vary freely without constraining them to sum to one as is under constant returns to 
scale. Our results do not change. 
We adopt this admittedly restrictive formulation for lack of better of alternatives. The 
alternative methodology of Olley and Pakes (1996) would not be problem free in our framework 
for it implies restricting the analysis to those firms which exhibit non-zero investment flows. In 
most databases and more particularly in the service sector, this boils down to a substantial loss 
                                                     
5 Clearly, not all of these items (e.g. “production stocked”) are equally relevant for the various service sub-sectors. 
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of observations, which is clearly not desirable. This problem is even more serious in our 
database, given that FiBEn does not report investment flows whatsoever, and we have to infer 
investment data taking time difference for capital stocks. The Olley-Pakes methodology is 
simply not an option. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) offer a potentially more palatable alternative. 
Instead of investment, they use intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity 
shocks. This is potentially good because typically many datasets will contain significantly less 
“zero observations” in materials than in firm-level investment. Yet the use of intermediate inputs 
as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks does not appear appropriate in our service sector 
database: for most sectors we cover (accounting, legal, architecture, engineering,…), 
intermediate inputs (raw materials, supply…) represent only a small share of turnover
6
 and are 
weakly correlated to production (sales in professional services may change without any change 
to their intermediate inputs). Hence, the monotonicity condition required by Levinsohn and 
Petrin is not fulfilled for these sectors.
7
 The lower panel in Table 1 (also labeled Table 1.2) 
contains some slightly surprising data. It is shown that, as expected, the turnover of Italian firms 
is on average much lower than the turnover of French firms. This is consistent with a higher 
frequency of small firms in AIDA. Yet, when looking at productivity, one finds that labor 
productivity levels are actually lower in France than in Italy (about 5% lower for the median). 
This somewhat unexpected result stems from the fact that the average number of employees is 
also comparatively very small in Italy. So we have that both numerator and denominator - the 
average turnover and the average number of employees - are much smaller in Italy than in 
France but the denominator more than offset the numerator differences. As a result, the 
unconditional measure of average labor productivity reported in Table 1.2 - based on gross 
output and on a rough indicator of the labor input - is smaller for the average, the median firm 
and the entire size distribution of French firms when compared to Italian firms (although the 
dispersion around the mean is very high). When we look at productivity growth rates, anyway, 
our summary data present evidence more aligned with common sense: French firms exhibit 
definitely higher TFP growth rates than Italian firms. Differences between the two databases are 
partly controlled for by firm fixed effects. Therefore, as long as our results stem from the time 
series variation in the data, the summary features of our sample appear to satisfactorily 
replicate common sense, which is reassuring. 
Regulation 
The second half of our data set concerns competition indicators. This is essentially made of 
two main variables: barriers to entry, as a regulatory indicator, and mark-up which, in line with 
some previous studies, we take as the main channel through which regulatory impediments to 
competition impact productivity. Recalling the chronology and objectives of all pieces of 
regulative activity is a complex task that goes beyond the scope of this paper. To make just an 
example, both Italy and France absorbed the 96/19/EC to reform the Telecommunication 
industry. After adopting this directive, France and Italy continued the liberalization process of 
the market by privatizing the incumbent France Telecom
8
 and Telecom Italia in 1997, releasing 
                                                     
6 In our sample, intermediate consumptions represented 71% of turnover, but only 33% in the accounting sector and 
38% in the legal sector. 
7 Correlation between changes in value added and in intermediate consumption stands at 33% only. 
8 However, only in September 2004 did the share of the French State in France Telecom go below 50%. 
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licences for mobile telephone, opening up the fixed line segment, and instituting the 
independent “Authorities” for Telecommunications (ART/now ARCEP in France and AGCOM in 
Italy), ruled by Law n° 96-659 in France and by Law 481/1995 and 249/1997 in Italy. In 2003 for 
Italy and 2004 for France, Codes for Electronic Communications were approved, encompassing 
all the most recent European directives in terms of electronic transmissions and 
communications, in particular broad band diffusion. The extent of market openness in each 
sector is summarized in our PMR index.
9
 Barriers to entry are industry-wide indicators derived 
from the OECD PMR (Product Market Regulation) database. For each of the two countries, we 
built this indicator on the basis of the OECD Regulatory Indicators methodology as detailed in 
Woelfl, Wanner, Kozluk and Nicoletti (2009). We use Conway and Nicoletti (2006) to derive 
barrier to entry indicators for retail, professional services (legal, accounting, engineering, and 
architecture professions) and network industries (telecoms, post, air passenger transport, and 
road freight).
10
 The OECD officially releases a non-manufacturing index (NMR), that can be 
divided into three sub-indicators: (1) Energy, transport and communication (ETRC); (2) Retail 
distribution and business services (RBSR); (3) Regulatory impact (RI). Being interested in 
ETRC and RBSR, we used all available information and legislation sources to update these 
indicators for each year in the interval 1998-2007, both for France and Italy. Of the three 
available indicators of sector-specific PMR (barriers to entry, public ownership, price controls), 
we kept Barriers to entry as our index to instrument the mark-up. We took directly the OECD 
indicators when available in the period of analysis (1998-2007) or we filled the blanks starting 
from the basic questionnaire so as to compute the indicator between two computation dates. 
The sectors were selected based on the availability of non-zero indices of regulatory barriers to 
entry in order to evaluate the within-industry correlation between product market regulation and 
performance, proxied by productivity. 
For the information pieces not available through the OECD database, we referred to official 
legislation and documents and publications of: the appropriate Department or Regulation 
Authority (if it exists), the Antitrust Authority in Italy, associations (in particular, for professional 
services, we referred to professional registers), the Bank of Italy, the appropriate European DG, 
the MICREF database and OECD. Unlike the OECD, we use the same questions and weights 
to compute the low level indicator for each sector separately rather than the average for all 
sectors. More details are given in the Data Appendix. 
Mark-up 
Barriers to entry as such are not enough to hamper the productivity performance of 
purchasing firms unless the high barriers translate into high mark-ups. This is why we 
constructed firm-level measures of mark-ups. They are computed as follows: 
   
                                                     
9 As an example, the Italian index for Telecom market changed from 5.4 (highly regulated) in 1996 to 0 (unregulated) in 
2000. The French index changed from 5.1 in 1995 to 0 in 1998. 
10 The OECD list of network industries would also include electricity, gas and rail. We left them out for we had too few 
observations for these industries. 
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where “capital costs” are computed multiplying a measure of the net rate of returns - the interest 
rates on ten-year Government bonds - times the sum of capital stock and inventories. The 
mark-ups computed like this are much higher on average in Italy than in France. 
The extreme values for all of the main variables are cleaned using Tukey’s method, as 
recommended by Kremp (1995), i.e. removing those firms whose value in logs of a variable is 
greater than the third quartile plus three times the inter-quartile gap or is less than the first 
quartile minus three times the inter-quartile gap. 
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To analyze the relationship between deregulation and firm productivity, we use a two-stage 
estimation strategy. In the first stage we investigate whether changes in regulation - in most 
cases deregulation - has changed the mark-up of firms in the industry where reform took place, 
and in the expected direction (deregulation bringing about less rent). In the second stage, we 
test whether the induced changes in markups, originated from diminished barriers to entry, have 
translated into TFP changes. 
We assume that total factor productivity is related to rents as measured by the mark-up 
according to the following log-linear form: 
 
 
where TFP indicates the level of total factor productivity, µ is the mark-up, DS is a demand 
shifter at the firm level (the growth rate of turnover at current prices), btc is a matrix of country-
year dummies, ηi is a vector of firm specific fixed effects, and the i, c, j and t subscripts indicate 
- respectively - firm, country, industry and time. Finally, ε is an idiosyncratic shock to productivity. 
Equation (1) says that TFP depends on the level of competition, as reflected by the mark-up, 
lagged TFP, a demand shifter (firm turnover/sales at current prices) and country-year and firm 
fixed effects aimed at capturing residual firm heterogeneity. 
The inclusion of lagged TFP is motivated by the fact that, as competition acts through time 
only gradually altering market structure and firm behavior, it is desirable to allow exogenous 
variables to have a lasting impact on TFP through the lagged endogenous variable.
11
 
The impact of demand on TFP through unmeasured factor utilization (see Cette, Dromel, 
Lecat and Paret, 2011) is controlled for by the use of firm-level demand shifters and, at the 
macroeconomic level, through Country by Year dummies, b, to account for the business cycle. 
The firm-specific fixed effects are meant to capture residual heterogeneity in firm size, 
geographic location, industry or unobserved management quality. Nonetheless, like in a typical 
linear dynamic panel data model, by construction, unobserved fixed effects are correlated with 
the lagged dependent variable. 
Thus, we will estimate the parameters by the consistent GMM estimator, paying attention to 
the choice of the weighting matrix in the variance/covariance of the residuals (Windmeijer, 
2005). 
                                                     
11 We ought to say that equation (1) is not fully reflecting the impact of competition as we are unable to take firm 
entry/exit into account. Competition may indeed act by forcing unproductive firms to exit and allowing new firms to enter 
as predicted through the so called allocative efficiency effect discussed in our survey section. Yet our samples do not 
embody information on whether a firm enters/exits the market or our databases. 
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Finally, there is another source of simultaneity that we are going to control for: both (current) 
mark-up and TFP are highly pro-cyclical, such that the estimate of the mark-up coefficient 
(without instruments) would be biased upward. Following previous research in this field (Griffith, 
Harrison and Simpson, 2010; Ospina and Schiffbauer, 2010), we adopt a two-step empirical 
strategy with the purpose of solving the latter problem, paying attention to identify the 
parameters of interest that are valid under certain assumptions. 
We therefore estimate a first stage equation, with the mark-up as the dependent variable 
and the index of product market regulation an some controls among the regressors, and a 
second stage (equation 1) where we use the (predicted) level of rents as our main variable of 
interest. 
Equation (2) is indeed the first stage specification of our model: 
 
 
In the baseline specification, our main instrument for the mark-up is BAR, the indicator of 
barriers to entry (as measured by the PMR index). The main instrument is thus sector specific, 
as well as time and country-varying. Hence, when estimating this model, we need to correct the 
standard errors for clustering (Moulton, 1990). We do it at the sector level. 
Even in the first stage, we control for economy-wide and firm-specific business cycle effects 
through DS, the demand shifter (the growth of current-price firm turnover)
12
 and b, the country-
by-year dummies.  
In the set of controls Z, we include the squared turnover growth, the lagged TFP growth, 
and the change in employment at the firm level. This is to account for the fact that mark-up is 
likely higher in more successful firms in productivity and employment creation terms. 
Unobserved firm fixed effects are also allowed to characterize the mark-up. 
We will use both the within-group or GMM consistent estimators to predict the mark-up in 
equation (2).  
To sum up, in our two-stage model, the list of our excluded instruments includes BAR at t-1, 
the growth rate of contemporaneous squared turnover, lagged TFP growth and the lagged 
change in employment, while the endogenous variables to be instrumented are the mark-up, the 
demand shifter and lagged TFP. 
Note that, being excluded from the second stage, BAR affects TFP only through the mark-
up and not directly.
13
 Our assumption on BAR implies that the full-fledged (impact + delayed) 
effect of liberalizing entry on productivity can be computed by combining the estimated 
coefficients from the first and the second stage of our empirical exercise. In one of our 
robustness checks, we allow for an alternative specification where BAR enters directly into the 
second stage. We also implement the C-test of endogeneity of excluded instruments which 
confirm the exogeneity of BAR as well as the other instruments. Both eq.(1) and (2) will be 
tested under a robustness check process, as explained the next section. 
                                                     
12 Notice that the demand shifter is also instrumented through the lagged change in employment, as in the second 
stage. 
13 It would be possible to argue that barriers to entry are themselves not exogenous: however, Sargan-Hansen tests 
confirm the exogeneity of this instrument; one source of reverse causality would be the fact that sectors with low mark-
up or low TFP ask to be protected by barriers, but in that case, λ1, the barrier coefficient, would be biased downward; 
hence as long as this coefficient is positive, our qualitative results remain robust. 
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5 RESULTS 
We present the first stage results from our analysis, then we discuss the second stage 
results together with the OLS estimates. Finally we present the results from some robustness 
checks. 
 Baseline regressions (table 2) 5.1
As shown in Table 2, expected from our previous discussion, mark-up levels appear to 
depend positively on the level of barriers to entry: this is consistent with the idea that barriers to 
entry protect the incumbents and make them benefit from rents. The demand shifter variable is 
positively correlated to mark-ups as increasing cyclical activity, reflected by turnover growth, 
tends to support the use of capacity and hence mark-ups. Other excluded instruments are used 
in the second stage equation (lagged differenced dependent variable and employment). We 
integrate them into the first stage equation but our evidence do not change. The barrier-to-entry 
coefficient is strongly statistically significant and not too far from a point wise estimate of almost 
0.035. Therefore, the impact of barriers to entry on mark-ups is large, at least for some 
industries: a 5-point decrease in entry barriers - i.e. the actual decline in the barriers to entry 
indicator for Telecom in France over the 1995-2007 period - would chop off more than 17 
percentage points in the mark-up. The results for equation (1) are reported in column (3) of 
Table 2. The list of instruments includes the entry barrier indicator, the lagged first-differenced 
employment and TFP. All tests show that we have strong and valid instruments for the equation. 
As shown in the next sections, results are robust to changes in instruments, specifications and 
exclusion of outliers. The lagged dependent variable - log TFPt-1 - is statistically significant and 
fairly sizable. The point-wise estimates are around 0.3, bounded away from one. This confirms 
that the short-run and long-run correlations of mark up (and entry barriers) with TFP are 
different, and that product market regulation tends to result in persistent outcomes. 
Based on our estimates, the order of magnitude of this difference is as high as 1.5 pp. As 
expected, the demand shift has a positive impact on TFP, as greater use of capacity is not fully 
captured in our measure of TFP. As far as our main variable of interest is concerned, the level 
of mark-up is negatively correlated with TFP.
14
 This is consistent with the results in Nickell 
(1996), Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) and Griffith, Harrison and Simpson (2010). The 
point-wise estimate for the mark-up is negative (-0.202). 
When multiplied by +0.0349 (the average counterpart of entry barriers on the mark-up), this 
would give an estimated effect of entry barriers on TFP of -0.007 in the short run and -0.010 in 
the long-run, a significant effect. A 5-point reduction in barriers, such as the one experienced by 
Telecom in France, would increase TFP in the long run by 5 per cent. If both countries were to 
adopt OECD’s countries best practices for service sector regulations, it would increase services’ 
TFP in the long run by 3.5 per cent in France and 3 per cent in Italy. We believe that this effect 
is even underestimated, as we do not take into account the fact that lower barriers to entry will 
lead productive firms to enter the market and unproductive ones to exit (allocative efficiency 
effect). Our results may have a caveat: we take into account the impact of barriers to entry only 
                                                     
14 In the annex, the within FE results are presented. As expected, an upward bias shows up in the estimates of the 
coefficient of the mark-up, as both TFP and mark-up are highly pro-cyclical, as emphasized by the coefficient of the 
demand shifter. 
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indirectly, through the mark-up. Barriers to entry could have a direct, independent effect on TFP, 
for example by enabling shareholders to better monitor the performance of managers 
(Holmström, 1982). However, the coefficient of barriers to entry, when directly introduced into 
the second-stage, is not significant and, moreover, the C-tests of individual instrument validity 
(cf. section 5.6 and Table 7) confirm the exogeneity of barriers to entry. Hence, mark-up seems 
to capture most of the impact of barriers to entry. This also suggests that our identifying 
assumption is not rejected by the data. The linear formulation is not the only game in town, 
though. Based on Aghion, Bloom, Griffith and Howitt, we test for a quadratic impact. However, 
Askenazy, Cahn and Irac (2013) showed that the quadratic relationship between competition 
and R&D held mostly for large firms, while the relationship was largely linear for smaller firms. 
Moreover, it may not hold in the service sector, which relies less on R&D than manufacturing 
sectors. In this new specification, we could not identify correctly and separately the linear and 
the quadratic terms and the results were very fragile. Hence, our preferred formulation is the 
linear one, which appears more robust. 
 Country heterogeneity (table 3) 5.2
In Table 3, we allow the slope to differ between the two countries, both for barriers to entry 
and the markup. For barriers to entry, it turns out that the estimated coefficient for France is 
much larger than the Italian one: 0.045 as opposed to 0.010. This is partly due to a composition 
effect of the two databases: the Italian database includes a bigger proportion of small firms than 
the French one (Table 1.1) and the barriers to entry coefficient is significantly larger for 50 
employees or above (cf. section 5.3 and Table 4). 
As in the mark-up equation, the estimated slope coefficients of the second stage appear in 
fact not to be equal in the two countries. The mark-up coefficient is much bigger - in absolute 
value - for Italy than for France: -0.5 as opposed to -0.2. We conjecture that this is due to the 
fact that firms, when faced with stringent regulation, may divert a bigger fraction of their value 
added into the black market in Italy than in France. Taking these estimates at face value, one 
can obtain the short-run and the long-run impact of entry barriers for TFP. The long-run effect of 
a one-point increase in barriers to entry would amount to a TFP variation of -0.75% for Italy and 
-1.2% for France. 
 Size heterogeneity (table 4) 5.3
In Table 4, we let the slopes differ according to firm size. The relevant threshold was found 
at 50 employees which, at least in France, triggers many regulatory constraints (creation of 
work councils, Hygiene and Security Council, etc.). Small firms may have a different sensitivity 
to competition and regulation, although it is hard to determine theoretically in which direction. 
Bankruptcy is more threatening for small firms, which should make them more sensitive to the 
impact of competition (Nickel et alii, 1997); on the other hand, small firms suffer less from 
manager-shareholders agency problems as there is a larger proportion of small firms owned by 
their managers (Hölmstrom, 1982). Our results reflect this balanced theoretical analysis: 
barriers to entry tend to have a smaller impact on mark-up for small firms, although the 
difference is not very large; no significant effect is found on mark-up. 
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 Industry heterogeneity: Retail sector evidence (table 5) 5.4
The firms in the retail sector represent two thirds of our sample. Hence, in order to test 
whether the estimated relationships hold true for this sector in some special way, we add a 
Retail sector dummy interacted with barrier to entry in equation 2 and with mark-up in equation 
1. A statistically significant interaction term would imply that firms in the retail sector display a 
different elasticity from the rest of the sample. The results are presented in Table 5. For the first 
stage, the retail sector mark-up is significantly more sensitive to barriers to entry than other 
sectors: a one-point decrease in Retail barrier to entry leads to a 6.5 percentage points 
decrease in mark-up, compared to 2.5 points elsewhere. This result is quite appealing as there 
are lower fixed costs in entering this sector compared to other sectors (in particular network 
industries). Entry is easier when regulatory barriers are lifted. In the second stage, the retail 
dummy coefficient is not significant, showing that it does not differ from other sectors with 
regard to the impact of mark-up on performance. 
 Robustness checks (table 6, 7 and 8) 5.5
We perform a number of additional robustness checks of our main results. First, we test for 
robustness to the exclusion of specific observations (Table 6). Column 1 presents the reference 
regression. Column 2 presents the regression removing the top and bottom 10% of TFP values 
for each firm. Columns 3-8 present regressions removing one by one the sectors representing 
more than 2% of the total observations. 
Coefficient signs appear robust to all of these exclusions. The mark-up coefficient is 
stronger when removing the top and bottom 10%, which is a particularly good sign of 
robustness, but lower when removing some sectors. The Sargan tests are still valid for all 
regressions. The second set of robustness checks concerns the choice of the instruments 
(Table 7). In the reference result (column 1), we use barriers to entry as the excluded 
instrument, as a competition indicator, the lagged differenced dependent variable in an 
Arellano-Bond style, lagged differenced employment and twice differenced turnover, as demand 
shifters. In order to test for the robustness of this instrumentation, we first remove sequentially 
our instruments and replace them with the age of the firm, which is a more neutral instrument 
(column 2-4). 
The results, in particular the mark-up coefficient, are robust to removing employment or the 
lagged dependent variable, and the Sargan test remains valid. When removing barriers to entry 
or the demand shifter (turnover), the mark-up coefficient is still negative but no longer significant, 
although the Sargan test is still valid (columns 5-6). A difference-in-Sargan or C-test is 
conducted to check the validity of instruments individually. None are rejected and in particular, 
the exogeneity of barriers to entry is confirmed, which supports our hypothesis of an 
intermediated impact of regulation on TFP through the mark-up. This shows that the efficiency 
of the instrumentation of the mark-up depends heavily on barrier to entry, which captures the 
intensity of competition, and correction for the firm-specific cycle. 
Finally, we test robustness to changes in specification and estimation methods (Table 8). 
We first remove the firm-specific demand-shifter (turnover) and the lagged dependent variable 
(columns 2 and 3). The mark-up coefficient remains negative and significant, although it is lower. 
GMM estimator barely affects the results, as shown in column 4 (estimate without using GMM). 
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Then we change the way we compute TFP, by allowing non-constant returns to scale. This is 
not our preferred formulation as estimation techniques with free parameters for labor and capital 
tend to be either biased by unobserved productivity shocks or rely on proxies such as 
intermediate inputs (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), which are not relevant for the service sectors 
we cover. The coefficient of mark-up is barely changed by the use of this “free parameters” TFP, 
while the demand shifter has a higher coefficient, reflecting a more pro-cyclical TFP. In line with 
Aghion et alii (2009), we introduce a distance to frontier variable, based on mean TFP of the last 
sector-year decile of TFP. This variable is positive as expected and significant, and the mark-up 
coefficient is slightly higher but significant. Then we turn to a very different specification, in first 
difference. Equation (1) is taken in differences, thus removing firm-fixed effects. In the first stage 
equation, barriers to entry are not differentiated, as it is a rather inert indicator. The strength of 
the instruments is hence not as strong, as we regress changes in mark-up on the level of 
barriers to entry. 
Coefficients have the expected signs, although the mark-up coefficient is not estimated as 
precisely, which could be sensible, given the loss of efficiency of the instruments. We conclude 
that our specification withstands most, although not all, the sensitivity and robustness analyses. 
Our preferred linear formulation appears to be robustly estimated. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have studied the relationship between one specific type of regulation, 
namely barriers to entry, and total factor productivity in the same industry where regulation is 
present. We find a negative relation between our main variables of interest: this is because 
entry barriers are associated to higher mark-up, which in turn is negatively correlated to 
productivity. The estimated relation appears to be crucially intermediated by the firm mark-up. 
As expected, our results indicate that the short run effect of entry barriers are smaller (by about 
one and a half times) than its long-run effects. If both countries were to adopt OECD countries’ 
best practice for services regulation, their long-run productivity in these sectors would increase 
by 3.5 per cent in France and 3 per cent in Italy. These estimates are however underestimated 
as we do not take into account the allocative efficiency effect from alleviating barriers to entry. 
Whether the partial correlation between our variables of interest is the result of a quadratic 
specification - measuring the so called “Aghion effect” - remains to be substantiated in further 
research. 
This effect is more likely to materialize in high-tech industries, where the so called “escape 
competition” effect is plausible, rather than in the service industries we are looking at in our 
study. And it is also more likely to be important for variables measuring innovation efforts such 
as R&D and productivity growth, as opposed to productivity levels. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA METHODOLOGY 
The OECD PMR incorporates two distinct indexes: the non-manufacturing sectors (NMR
15
) 
indicator and the FDI-restrictiveness indicator. The NMR comprises network sectors (ETRC 
indicator
16
), retail trade and professional services. The indexes are built on the basis of codes 
associated to questions answered by each OECD member state – typically related to sector’s 
entry regulation, ownership share of public authorities, and price controls. 
We focus on the NMR index in the particular low level indicator of entry regulation called 
“Barriers to Entry”. We use the same questions and weights of the OECD survey to compute the 
(low) level indicator for each sector separately, updating the value for each year in 1995-2007 
period. 
As for “Barriers in network sectors”, the PMR weighted index is computed as entry 
regulation
17
 for air, road, post and TLC. 
The “Barriers in Retail sector” weighted index is calculated as: 
⅓ Licenses or permits needed to engage in commercial activity+ 
⅓ Specific regulation of large outlets+ 
⅓ Protection of existing firms. 
“Barriers in Professional Services sectors” are calculated on the basis of the following main 
issues: 
⅓ Licensing + 
⅓ Education requirements + 
⅓ Quotas and economic needs test. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 For a complete list of the questions and coding of answers of the indicators, see Conway P., Nicoletti G., Product 
market regulation in non-manufacturing sectors of OECD countries: measurement and highlights, 2006, 
ECO/WKP(2006)58 (No. 530). 
16 ETRC indicator refers to electricity, gas, air transport, rail, road freight transport, post and telecommunications. 
17 See table 13 page 51 of Woefl A., Wanner I., Kozluk T., Nicoletti G. (2009). 
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